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State and local first responders in the United States lack a common strategic 
approach to prepare for complex coordinated attacks (CCAs). Inconsistent terminology 
and insufficient guidance from all levels of government and academia complicate 
matters. State and local agencies face three main barriers to CCA response 
preparedness. First, the United States has not experienced a CCA like those in 
Mumbai or Paris; this renders the threat low probability, if high consequence, and 
thus low priority. Second, preparedness funding in the United States is declining 
across the board; only high-priority, high-probability events receive necessary funding 
and attention. Third, if a CCA were to occur today without a unified response plan, 
first responders would attempt to bring order to chaos; but, because this type of event 
is qualitatively different from those for which responders have trained, such a response 
could prove to be disastrous.  
This thesis analyzed and assessed federal summary reports from current 
preparedness programs. It surveyed program participants about the programs’ value and 
use. When combined with the federal report examination, the survey results revealed that 
even without a national CCA strategy, these programs increase participants’ preparedness 
and resilience, and first responders may be adapting to the current threat environment. 
Three recommendations are provided to help address the findings and augment state and 
local first responder preparedness before a CCA occurs. 
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State and local first responders in the United States lack a common strategic 
approach to preparing for complex coordinated attacks (CCAs).1 Scholarly research, 
analysis, and shared best practices are important pillars to help first responders become 
better prepared and resilient, yet these components are mostly absent from the CCA 
narrative. Inconsistent terminology and insufficient guidance from all levels of 
government and academia complicate matters, which further complicates CCA 
preparedness for state and local jurisdictions. For these reasons, the current domestic 
approach to CCAs requires further inquiry. 
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, numerous government 
reports have addressed preparedness, including the 2004 9/11 Commission Report and 
the 2003 Gilmore Commission report, which identified “a lack of clear strategic guidance 
from the Federal level about the definition and objectives of preparedness and how States 
and localities will be evaluated in meeting those objectives.”2 The threat of a CCA and 
the destruction experienced in the Mumbai and Paris attacks demand that the United 
States get the solution to this problem right.  
There are three main points to the CCA issue that have implications for state and 
local governments. First, the United States has not experienced a CCA like those in 
Mumbai or Paris; this renders the threat low probability, if high consequence, and thus 
low priority. Given these inferences, it is difficult to establish a national CCA policy and 
get first responders and public safety leaders to fully embrace, fund, and accept CCA 
preparedness if an attack has not occurred in the United States. Second, and perhaps as a 
direct consequence to the first point, preparedness funding in the United States is 
declining across the board; only high-priority and high-probability events receive 
1 For the purposes of this research, first responders are members of any discipline that has an 
emergency response mission, such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical services. 
2 Gilmore Commission, The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction— 
V. Forging Americas New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2003), http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html. 
xvi 
necessary funding and attention. For example, since 2008, federal funds to support state 
and local response efforts have decreased by $662 million.3 Further, the White 
House’s 2018 fiscal year budget calls for a $582.8 million reduction. Should this 
reduction occur, such programs as the newly formed Complex Coordinated Terrorist 
Attacks program and the Countering Violent Extremist Grant would be eliminated.4 
Third, if a CCA were to occur today without a unified plan, first responders would 
attempt to bring order to chaos, just as the first responders did on 9/11; but, because 
this type of event is qualitatively different from those for which we have trained, 
such a response could prove to be disastrous. In the Mumbai and Paris CCAs, local 
agencies faced significant challenges with incident command, strategic 
communication, and information management; limitations in both training and 
equipment; and inadequate response protocols.5 In sum, these challenges added to the 
confusion of an unfolding multi-site attack scenario. 
This thesis analyzed and assessed thirty-four federal summary reports from the 
Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Workshop Series (JCTAWS) and the Integrated 
Emergency Management Course (IEMC): Preparing Communities for a Complex 
Coordinated Attack programs, which support state and local agencies preparing for a 
CCA. Further, an anonymous survey was conducted of participants 2011–2016 JCTAWS 
and IEMC participants in order to assess the effects of the course and analyze barriers to 
implementation of recommendations. This project provides five comprehensive findings 
3 The analysis was conducted from fiscal year 2008–2016 through an open source at www.dhs.gov. 
This data was derived from allotted grant dollars within the State Homeland Security Program and the 
Urban Area Security Initiative. In 2008, the total dollar amount was $1,644,555,000 and in 2016 the dollar 
amount was $982,000,000. “Grant Programs Directorate Overview,” Department of Homeland Security, 
last revised November 7, 2008, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grant-program-overview-fy2009.pdf; 
“DHS Announces Funding Opportunity for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Preparedness Grants,” Department of 
Homeland Security, February 16, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/16/dhs-announces-funding-
opportunity-fiscal-year-fy-2016-preparedness-grants. 
4 “U.S. Senate Report: Administration Budget Cuts Counterterrorism Programs by $583 Million,” U.S. 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, July 13, 2017, www.hsgac.senate.gov/ 
media/minority-media/us-senate-report-administration-budget-cuts-counterterrorism-programs-by-583-
million. 
5 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009); Homeland Security 
Advisory Council and Paris Public Safety Delegation, “The Attacks on Paris: Lessons Learned” (white 




and three recommendations to enhance both JCTAWS and IEMC as well as to improve 
the domestic conversation through leadership and scholarly research.  
The research discovered that, even without a national CCA strategy, the JCTAWS 
and IEMC programs increase preparedness and resilience. However, the analyzed results 
of state and local participation indicated that major cities and jurisdictions do not have a 
unified plan to respond to a CCA incident and that there is no clear picture of how many 
gaps have been addressed by participants. Further, first responders are adapting to a 
variety of environmental injects, including the increase of active shooter events, which 
may decrease attention to the CCA issue because it is a low-frequency, high-threat 
consequence. Three recommended imperatives will help address the findings, including 
the establishment of a national high-threat institution to aggregate and support state and 
local programs with research, analysis, and best practices for emerging threats. Further, 
JCTAWS and IEMC can be enhanced by creating opportunities for jurisdictions that may 
not have the funds or resources to participate in these programs, including a stand-alone 
assessment program of emergency response plans and policies. Lastly, recognizing the 
power and influence of national leadership collaboration, this thesis implores a 
collaborative regional, state, and national discussion of implications and a way forward to 
address this threat. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prepare for the unknown by studying how others in the past have coped 
with the unforeseeable and the unpredictable. 
—George S. Patton 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
State and local first responders in the United States lack a common strategic 
approach to prepare for complex coordinated attacks (CCAs).1 The National 
Counterterrorism Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) define a complex coordinated attack (CCA) as a “coordinated 
assault on one or more locations in close succession, initiated after little or no warning, 
employing one or more of the following: firearms, explosives, and arson.”2 However, 
domestically, scholarly research, analysis, and shared best practices—essential pillars for 
first responders to better prepare and increase resiliency—are mostly absent from 
domestic strategic CCA preparedness plans and guidance. This was acknowledged in a 
2003 federal report by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore 
Commission), which promised that “a lack of clear strategic guidance from the Federal 
level about the definition and objectives of preparedness and how States and localities 
will be evaluated in meeting those objectives.”3 And in 2015, the National Preparedness 
Goal (NPG) highlights five core mission areas that, once achieved, should result in 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this research, first responders are members of any discipline that has an 
emergency response mission, such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical services. 
2 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “NCTC/DHS/FBI 2015 JCTAWS Comprehensive Summary Report—2011–
2015” (report, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2016). 
3 Gilmore Commission, The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction— 
V. Forging Americas New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2003), 5, http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html.  
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preparedness for any hazard in the United States.4 But the lack of strategic CCA guidance 
impedes proper or full achievement of those goals by state and local first responders. 
Inconsistent terminology complicates the discussion of CCAs.5 The media, public 
safety, and the armed forces have used the term CCA, as well as “complex attack” or 
“coordinated attack,” to describe a variety of attacks. However, in many examples, a 
simple attack with conventional weapons, such as an active-shooter event, is categorized 
as complex and coordinated. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for 
example, defines a CCA as an act of terrorism that may:  
Involve synchronized and independent team(s) at multiple locations 
sequentially or in close succession, initiated with little or no warning, and 
employing one or more weapon systems: firearms, explosives, fire as a 
weapon, and other non-traditional attack methodologies which are 
intended to result in scores of casualties.6 
Regardless of the tactics involved―whether fire, shooting, or a vehicle attack―a CCA is 
particularly destructive if the attack cycle occurs at multiple locations and in close 
succession. The response to a CCA would likely outpace the availability of first-
responder resources and capabilities. The need to manage multiple hazards, threats, and 
action plans would be challenging. 
Three main points link implications for state and local governments. First, the 
United States has not experienced a CCA like those in Mumbai or Paris; this renders the 
threat low probability, if high consequence, and thus low priority. This may explain why 
it has been difficult to establish a national CCA policy and get first responders and public 
safety leaders to fully embrace, fund, and accept CCA preparedness. Second, and perhaps 
as a direct consequence of the first point, preparedness funding in the United States is 
declining across the board; only high-priority and high-probability events receive 
                                                 
4 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Preparedness Goal, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
DHS, 2015). 
5 Prior to 2001, cyber terrorism experts used the term “complex-coordinated.” No information was 
located to clarify when the term “complex coordinated attack” was first used and by whom. 
6 “Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Program to Prepare Communities for Complex Coordinated Terrorist 




necessary funding and attention. For example, since 2008, federal funds to support state 
and local response efforts have decreased by $662 million.7 Further, the White House’s 
2018 fiscal year budget calls for a $582.8 million reduction. Should this reduction occur, 
such programs as the newly formed Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks program and 
the Countering Violent Extremist Grant would be eliminated.8 Finally, if a CCA were to 
occur today in a major city or town without a unified plan, first responders would respond 
to, manage, and mitigate the incident. They would attempt to bring order to chaos in any 
fashion, just as the first responders did on 9/11. However, if guidance related to 
preparedness and baseline capabilities is weak or non-existent among state and local 
public safety disciplines, the response to a multi-site terrorist attack could be disastrous. 
In the Mumbai and Paris CCAs, local agencies faced significant challenges with incident 
command, strategic communication, and information management; limitations in both 
training and equipment; and inadequate response protocols.9 During the Mumbai CCA, 
fire and emergency services assets were uncoordinated with local law enforcement, 
which resulted in a delay of life-saving equipment.10 The Paris incident uncovered 
problems with law enforcement due in part to a disconnected centralized command 
between local and federal police assets.11 In sum, these challenges added to the confusion 
and delayed resources during an unfolding multi-site attack scenario. 
                                                 
7 The analysis was conducted for fiscal years 2008–2016 through an open source at www.dhs.gov. 
This data was derived from allotted grant dollars within the State Homeland Security Program and the 
Urban Area Security Initiative. In 2008, the total dollar amount was $1,644,555,000 and in 2016 the dollar 
amount was $982,000,000. “Grant Programs Directorate Overview,” Department of Homeland Security, 
last revised November 7, 2008, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grant-program-overview-fy2009.pdf; 
“DHS Announces Funding Opportunity for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Preparedness Grants,” Department of 
Homeland Security, February 16, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/16/dhs-announces-funding-
opportunity-fiscal-year-fy-2016-preparedness-grants. 
8 “U.S. Senate Report: Administration Budget Cuts Counterterrorism Programs by $583 Million,” U.S. 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, July 13, 2017, www.hsgac.senate.gov/ 
media/minority-media/us-senate-report-administration-budget-cuts-counterterrorism-programs-by-583-
million. 
9 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 
10 Rabasa et al. 
11 Adam Nossiter, “Response to Paris Attacks Points to Weaknesses in French Police Structure,” New 
York Times, December 31, 2015, sec. Europe, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/world/europe/ 
response-to-paris-attacks-points-to-weaknesses-in-french-police-structure.html. 
 4 
My assumption is that state and local first responders are in fact preparing to 
respond to a CCA, but measuring preparedness is difficult because no national plan or 
standardized benchmarks exist. As a result, emergency response disciplines such as fire 
and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical services may either improvise a 
strategy to manage an unfamiliar or emerging threat―which has been demonstrated to 
have downright damaging effects―or fail to implement current plans due to the complex 
and chaotic atmosphere.12 This thesis employs research, inquiry, and analysis to gain 
better insight into domestic CCA policies and programs that are specific to the first-
responder community.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis sought to answer the following questions: 
• What barriers exist to first responders reaching CCA preparedness? 
• How much do JCTAWS and IEMC increase preparedness? 
• Are first responders implementing recommendations after JCTAWS or 
IEMC? 
• What improvements could be made to the CCA strategy? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is very little literature or scholarly research that explains the meaning or 
minutiae of complex coordinated attacks. Law enforcement and armed forces 
professionals have written most of the literature on CCAs, albeit in dissimilar ways. 
Nevertheless, the use of the term CCA in a variety of sources helps to clarify the 
argument and exemplify the divergence in language. 
Classically, taxonomy is used in the sciences to describe the characteristics of 
living things and their relationships by characterizing or organizing them according to 
                                                 
12 “Paris Insights,” George Washington University Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, November 
2015, https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/image/CCHS_Paris%20Insights.pdf. 
 5 
their natural relationships.13 A taxonomic approach to CCA, with minor modifications, 
can help explain similarities and differences in attacks, which is helpful for both policy 
development and preparedness efforts.  
The New York Times labeled the 1983 Beirut attacks against the Marine barracks 
and, shortly after, the French Paratrooper barracks, as simultaneous attacks.14 Both attack 
teams deployed vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against two separate 
targets. This is the only known reference to the term “simultaneous attacks.” It is possible 
that the term simultaneous changed to coordinated over time.  
In early 2001, the Center for Strategic Studies produced a report that identified 
some of the security gaps that the United States has or will face. That report summarized 
the issue this way, nearly sixteen years ago: “US plans and programs must consider a 
possible future in which the use of weapons of mass destruction becomes a common 
aspect of asymmetric warfare, and in which complex and sophisticated attacks are 
conducted against both the U.S. and its allies.”15 The idea of “complex and sophisticated 
attacks” was prescient, and certainly shows that the CCA narrative was being discussed 
before 9/11.   
Angel Rabasa et al., RAND Corporation analysts, addressed the complexity of 
terrorist attacks in a 2009 article about the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Rabasa et al. do not 
mention the attacks’ coordination, only their complexity.16 This is important because the 
Mumbai attacks are widely considered both complex and coordinated: complex because 
they involved multiple teams, multiple weapons (IEDs, assault weapons, fire), and 
                                                 
13 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Taxonomy,” accessed November 27, 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/taxonomy. 
14 “On this Day: October 23,” New York Times, accessed November 6, 2016, www.nytimes.com/ 
learning/general/onthisday/991023onthisday_big.html#article. 
15 Anthony Cordesman, “Homeland Defense: Coping with the Threat of Indirect, Covert, Terrorist, 
and Extremist Attacks with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Defending America: Redefining the 
Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2001), 34.  
16 Rabasa et al., Lessons of Mumbai. 
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multiple locations in the city within a short period; coordinated because a “handler” 
directed and encouraged the attackers through a satellite phone to fulfill the attack plan.17 
Other attacks are compared and contrasted to the devastation and success of the 
Mumbai attacks, and are commonly referred to as a “Mumbai-style attacks.”18  John P. 
Blair et al. argue that this type of attack poses a concern to local police because of the use 
of small arms and multiple active-shooter tactics.19 The authors go on to suggest that the 
use of IEDs and small arms is nothing new, but they do not connect the importance of 
both the use of IEDs and small arms in a CCA.20 
One of the few sources to discuss a CCA explicitly is a 2016 Europol report on 
the Paris attacks, which it calls “complex, and well-coordinated.”21 The report notes 
similarities between Mumbai and Paris, including the use of AK-47 rifles, multiple public 
targets, and multiple attackers, but goes further than other reports on Paris by evaluating 
“impact,” or casualties.22 This is significant because no other report describes or 
evaluates the effectiveness of the attack in terms of the injured and dead. In effect, adding 
this characterization provides more information on important factors such as the 
preparedness levels of first responders, the success of the attackers, or perhaps even the 
location—such as a movie theater with limited ingress and egress. 
Much of the literature on specific CCAs, like Paris, neglects to identify the 
characteristics of such an attack. An example is an article by Paul Belkin, a European 
affairs analyst, in which he compares Paris and Mumbai but without providing any 
further explanation about how or why the attacks were coordinated.23 Coordination could 
indicate that there was a handler, or that someone else was directing the attack, as seen 
                                                 
17 Rabasa et al. 
18 John P. Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013). 
19 Blair et al. 
20 Blair et al. 




23 Paul Belkin, France: Efforts to Counter Islamist Terrorism and the Islamic State (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2015). 
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during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Without proof of coordination, as in the Mumbai attack, 
the author must assume that labeling the Paris attack as a coordinated terrorist attack 
results from a flawed narrative, or that it just seems like the best label. 
In another incident, the New York Police Department (NYPD) prepared an 
official briefing after the April 5, 2010 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, 
Pakistan. In the briefing, the NYPD states that this attack was a “complex attack,” but 
there is no discussion of how or why it was complex.24 The attackers arrived in two 
separate vehicles, which could suggest the attack was planned. But the use of the term is 
not helpful in understanding the issue. 
Another example can be found in the 2016 American University attack in Kabul, 
Afghanistan. News sources describe the incident as a complex attack. Two men with 
guns detonated at least one vehicle-borne IED, but the news article does not mention 
tactics or explain why the attack was complex.25  
In 2011, Brigadier General Carsten Jacobson, a U.S. Army International Security 
Assistance Force spokesperson, explained to the media the following differences between 
a complex attack and a coordinated attack: 
Complex Attack is an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements, 
which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e., 
indirect fire and direct fire, IED and surface to air fire) against one or 
more targets. Complex attacks differ from coordinated attacks due to the 
lack of any indication of a long-term planning process or prior preparation. 
Coordinated Attack is an attack that exhibits deliberate planning 
conducted by multiple hostile elements, against one or more targets from 
multiple locations. A coordinated attack may involve any number of 
weapon systems. The key difference between complex and coordinated is 
that a coordinated attack requires the indication of insurgent long-term 
planning.26 
                                                 
24 NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau, “NYPD Shield: U.S. Consulate Attack Peshawar, Pakistan” 
(intelligence brief, New York City Police Department, April 5, 2010). 
25 Mirwais Harooni and Hamid Shalizi, “Gunmen Attack American University of Afghanistan in 
Kabul,” Huffington Post, August 24, 2016, sec. WorldPost, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
american-university-kabul-attack-afghanistan_us_57bdb5f8e4b03d51368bd377. 
26 Tim Foxley, “‘Complex’ Attack on American University of Afghanistan,” Afghanhindsight (blog), 
August 25, 2016, https://afghanhindsight.wordpress.com/2016/08/25/complex-attack-on-american-
university-of-afghanistan/. 
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General Jacobson makes several important points here. First, he differentiates between 
the terms “complex” and “coordinated,” but also provides a clear purpose and meaning 
for each type of attack. Second, his perspective is based on combat experience, and 
therefore most likely derived from actual attack events. However, the coordination aspect 
is still not clear. A view from one lens suggests a coordinated attack could mean exactly 
as the general stated, that long-term planning is conducted before an attack. Another lens, 
however, suggests that coordination involves someone who is orchestrating the attack 
from a remote location. The latter occurred in the Mumbai attack, while the former 
occurred in other attacks such as in Paris and Beslan, Russia. 
In 2011, the NYPD produced another report stemming from the attack on the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. This attack involved multiple locations and assault 
weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and suicide vests. Unlike its 2010 report, which 
used the term “complex attack,” this attack was labeled by the NYPD as a “coordinated 
attack.”27 Both attacks―the Peshawar and Kabul attacks―exhibited the same tactics, but 
the first attack occurred at a single location and the second attack occurred at multiple 
locations. The only other difference, which would not fully explain the differences 
between labeling one attack complex and the other coordinated, is the use of the suicide 
vest in the 2011 attack. 
The Long War Journal used three labels to explain an attack that targeted police 
and local government officials in 2013. In the article, the author used “complex attack,” 
“complex assault,” and “complex conventional attack” interchangeably.28 The article 
referenced other attacks by a terrorist group using similar tactics, yet the author did not 
label those incidents as complex or conventional. The article did not clarify why this 
attack was complex, nor why the use of explosive-laden people or vehicles is considered 
a conventional act.  
The National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Joint Counterterrorism 
Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS) is a nationally recognized program that aims to 
                                                 
27 NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau, “NYPD Shield 
28 “ISIS Uses 8 Suicide Bombers in Complex Attack in Western Iraq,” The Long War Journal (blog), 
accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/isis_use_8_suicide_b.php. 
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addresses threats related to state and local preparedness. In the 2011 NCTC-JCTAWS 
Phase 1 report, common terms used include “complex attack,” “organized, coordinated, 
and multi-site attack,” and “complex multi-site terrorist attack.”29 The report does not 
explain what these terms mean, despite a reference to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 
However, a 2015 NCTC document, which is similar to the 2011 document, used different 
language, such as “complex terrorist attack” and “complex attack.”30 The change in 
language in 2015 indicates evolution of the description, and perhaps the progressing 
mechanism of CCA. 
In 2013, Tracy Frazzano and Matthew Snyder, two law enforcement 
professionals, developed a new taxonomy to describe a CCA. The article, published in 
the Homeland Security Affairs journal, defines Hybrid Targeted Violence (HTV) as an 
“intentional use of force to cause physical injury or death to a specifically identified 
population using multifaceted conventional weapons and tactics.”31 This definition could 
be used to describe violent protestors or anyone who shoots another person. The authors 
state that HTV is a better explanation of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
definition of “active shooter.”32 The authors also suggest that the HTV concept “clearly 
defines complex attacks” through the following formula: 
(Multiple Weapons) + (Targeted Population) + (Planned Violent Action) = 
Hybrid Targeted Violence33 
Frazzano and Snyder make a point in the article to apply HTV not only to terrorist 
incidents, but also to any incident that fits the formula, such as the Sandy Hook 
Elementary and Columbine High School shootings. The reference to these events 
diverges from other CCA characterizations because Frazzano and Snyder focus primarily 
on the active shooter situation through a law enforcement lens.  
                                                 
29 NCTC, DHS, and FBI, “NCTC/DHS/FBI Joint Counterterrorism Workshop Series Phase 1 Report 
(Jan-Dec 2011)” (report, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012). 
30 NCTC, DHS, and FBI, “2015 JCTAWS Comprehensive Summary Report.” 
31 Tracy Frazzano and Matthew Snyder, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional 
‘Active Shooter’ Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs (blog), February 13, 2014, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/253. 
32 Frazzano and Snyder. 
33 Frazzano and Snyder. 
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Further, the framework is very similar to the 2011 address by Brigadier General 
Jacobson in his reference to the differences between complex and coordinated attacks. 
For example, in the HTV definition, multiple weapons and a targeted population seem to 
align with Jacobson’s complex attack definition. Furthermore, the planned violent action 
reference in the HTV model matches Jacobson’s coordinated attack reference in 2011. 
However, the HTV model contradicts General Jacobson’s distinction between complex 
attacks and coordinated attacks, which appears to be his original intent. 
The term swarm attack has been used to describe a coordinated attack. According 
to Cerwyn Moore, in a 2012 West Point Center for Combating Terrorism article, swarm 
attacks are “high-risk, coordinated assaults sometimes directed against multiple targets or 
building complexes, using mobile groups to circumvent security measures, allowing 
attackers to inflict casualties, garner news coverage and, in recent years, to inflict 
considerable damage prior to the neutralization of the assailants.”34 It is important to note 
that Moore’s definition does not mention weapons, but is specific to the attack target and 
the intended use of such an attack. Further analysis of the literature explains the 
important aspects of “swarm attacks.” One, these incidents start with shooting. The use of 
firearms enhances the mobility of the attacking team. Two, swarm attacks include 
multiple targets to slow or confuse law enforcement. Three, these attacks require a level 
of leadership and military capacity. Few swarm attacks are spontaneous. Four, many of 
the tactics used in an attack are not new. Attackers will recognize barriers (before or 
during the attack) or homeland security systems and adapt.  
On July 7, 2005, London, England, was hit with an attack that involved four 
explosions over a one-hour period. All of the detonations targeted public transportation, 
and the first three were “near simultaneous.”35 In the official investigative report by the 
UK Honourable House of Commons, the event was labeled a “terrorist attack” and an 
                                                 
34 Cerwyn Moore, “The Threat from Swarm Attacks: Case Studies from the North Caucasus,” 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 22, 2012, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-threat-
from-swarm-attacks-case-studies-from-the-north-caucasus. 
35 Great Britain Parliament House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in 
London on 7th July 2005, vol. HC 1087 (London: The Stationery Office, 2006), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf. 
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“act of indiscriminate terror,” with no mention of complexity or coordination.36 The 
University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response 
to Terrorism (START) produced a report on the fifth anniversary of the London attacks 
that, terminologically, diverges from the official investigative report. In its report, 
START labeled the London attack as a “coordinated attack” rather than a terrorist 
attack.37 The variance between the official report and the START report emphasizes the 
variety in terminology. 
In summary, past literature has described, explained, and arranged the 
terminology for CCAs differently across many disciplines. One possible reason for this 
variance is that, since a CCA has not occurred in the United States, the terminology and 
composition of the threat is not fully understood or developed. Or, perhaps, the tactics of 
a CCA have evolved to a point that the issue is truly amorphous. Another explanation 
could be similar to the definition of terrorism. Professor of Law Sudha Setty sums up the 
problem by indicating that terrorism “law and policy depends on definition” and that “if 
an individual state is to address the problem of terrorist activity, it must first define 
terrorism’s parameters.”38 Perhaps CCA is no different. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The goal of this research was to discover factors that help or impede first 
responders preparing for a CCA. The two primary methods of inquiry were qualitative 
content and data analysis, along with thematic analysis to review JCTAWS and IEMC 
summary reports and survey responses from JCTAWS/IEMC participants. The two tools 
of measurement collected twenty-four JCTAWS and ten IEMC summary reports and 
anonymous responses from an approved online survey. The investigation looked for 
themes, areas of divergence, gaps, and results, which were compared to a qualitative 
                                                 
36 Great Britain Parliament House of Commons. 
37 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Background Report: 
On the Fifth Anniversary of the 7/7 London Transit Attack” (report, University of Maryland, 2010), 
http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/July07_LondonMetroBombing_2010.pdf. 
38 Sudha Setty, “What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years after 9/11,” University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 33, no. 1 (October 2011): 7, http://scholarship.law.upenn. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=jil. 
 12 
survey. Raw data from both sets (the JCTAWS and IEMC summary reports and survey) 
were analyzed and sorted into areas that were problematic. Questions for the online 
survey were developed from both hypothetical and known problem areas. 
There were three stages in the thematic analytical process.39 The first step was to 
develop themes inductively from the information found in the twenty-four JCTAWS and 
ten IEMC summary reports and the online survey. The second step was to code and 
record both data sets according to the themes and corresponding jurisdiction. The third 
step was to infer patterns and develop a set of recommendations and findings. 
Boyatzis explains that the thematic analysis process involves encoding qualitative 
information in order to “see” or sense patterns or occurrences.40 This process helps 
researchers synthesize varying types of information to increase “accuracy in 
understanding and interpreting observations” about a topic.41 This process demonstrates 
how data from JCTAWS and IEMC summary reports and data from the online survey 
results in the amalgamation of themes and patterns. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The following chapters investigate and analyze the nation’s process of preparing 
for a CCA. Chapter II evaluates two federal training programs, JCTAWS and IEMC, 
holistically and analyzes common themes, gaps, and challenges that first responder’s 
experience. Chapter III analyzes and synthesizes the survey results completed by the 
sample of JCTAWS and IEMC participants. Chapter IV outlines the major themes 
discovered during the research, including implementation and emergent challenges. 
                                                 
39 Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1998). 
40 Boyatzis, 4. 
41 Boyatzis, 5.  
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II. JCTAWS AND IEMC: BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS 
Management models based on planning and predicting instead of resilient 




The ambiguity and challenges outlined in the previous chapter underscore the 
need to conduct research both on the current status of CCA preparedness and the 
challenges that first responders are experiencing. The goals of this chapter are to 
emphasize that there is no playbook for CCA despite a plethora of federal guidance for 
other hazards, and to analyze and synthesize findings and recommendations from 
JCTAWS and IEMC reports. Although a small contribution to the issue, this chapter 
reflects on two federal programs specifically designed to challenge municipalities in a 
CCA.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Both JCTAWS and IEMC are consequences of global terrorist attacks and lessons 
learned.42 These courses are designed to stress the use of local emergency plans through 
a simulation of terrorist tactics and to enhance preparedness activities by addressing gaps 
in policy and local emergency procedures.  
Both courses are structured and organized around federal guidance, including the 
2015 National Preparedness Goal (NPG), which provides a vision for utilizing an 
integrated, whole-of-nation approach to build and sustain capabilities (prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery) in response to a variety of threats.43 The 
NPG does not mention any form of CCA, but it does offer, to a degree, a strategy for 
                                                 
42 FEMA: Assessing Progress, Performance, and Preparedness: Testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight 
and Emergency Management (2016) (statement of the Honorable Timothy Manning, FEMA deputy 
administrator). 
43 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
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preparedness. At the tactical level, the National Preparedness System (NPS) and the 
National Protection Framework consider the whole community as the driving force for 
safety and resilience, and for reaching the goals of the NPG. Mission area components of 
the NPS include: identifying and assessing risk, estimating capability requirements, 
buildings and sustaining capabilities, planning to deliver capabilities, validating 
capabilities, and reviewing and updating.44 The NPS does not mention CCA either, but 
does highlight complex incidents that involve multiple jurisdictions.45 The National 
Protection Framework focus includes intelligence and information sharing, interdiction 
and disruption, infrastructure systems, and risk management capabilities.46 In 2016, the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security released the National Preparedness Report 
(NPR). This report is a requirement of Presidential Policy Directive 8; its purpose is to 
provide federal, state, and local governments with practical insights into preparedness 
activities, and inform the community about program support and priorities, resource 
allotment, and community activity.47 Although the NPR does not address the term CCA, 
it does address programs and initiatives that support CCA preparedness: 
1. JCTAWS addresses prevention of and response to CCAs.48 
2. Federal and private sectors are engaging to enhance coordination to 
protect against a CCA; however, there is no mention of progress at the 
state and local first responder level.49  
 
                                                 
44 “National Preparedness System,” FEMA, accessed July 14, 2017, https://www.fema.gov/national-
preparedness-system. 
45 FEMA. 
46 DHS, National Protection Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: DHS, 2016), 12, www.fema.gov/ 
media-library-data/1466017309052-85051ed62fe595d4ad026edf4d85541e/National_Protection_ 
Framework2nd.pdf. 
47 “2016 National Preparedness Report,” FEMA, accessed April 7, 2017, www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/116951. 
48 DHS, National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: DHS, 2016), 27, 30. 
49 DHS, ii.  
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B. CCA PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS 
Global attacks and threats, particularly those that have occurred outside the 
United States, have shaped domestic preparedness activities. JCTAWS, for example, was 
born three years after the November 2008 Mumbai attack.50 The Mumbai attack is 
considered one of the more notable and unique CCAs because of the central command 
element, selection of soft targets, selection of weapons and tactics, pre-planning 
associated with the attack, and the number of dead and injured.51 In 2016, a second 
course, IEMC, was designed and made available to a wide variety of state and local 
agencies. Unlike JCTAWS, there is no data to suggest that IEMC was developed in 
response to a particular attack; however, both courses attempt to strengthen the state and 
local polices based on the challenges discovered during the Mumbai attack. Specifically, 
both courses address pre-attack challenges such as intelligence and information sharing, 
and collaboration and training. These courses also review core capabilities during the 
attack, such as medical surge, first responder resilience, operational coordination, and 
public warning. 
This thesis analyzed all JCTAWS and IEMC reports from calendar years 2011 
through 2016.52 In total, twenty-four JCTAWS and ten IEMC reports were obtained 
through an official federal process, which includes a formal request, completion of a non-
disclosure report, and approval from FEMA, the authorizing agency. Names and 
geographical identifiers of municipalities are redacted due to the classification of these 
documents and the sensitivity of the recommendations and findings, as well as the 
potential to expose vulnerabilities and weaknesses.53 
                                                 
50 NCTC, DHS, and FBI, “Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series: Comprehensive 
Summary Report (2011–2015)” (report, NCTC, 2016). 
51 Rabasa et al., Lessons of Mumbai. 
52 These documents were collected in the later part of 2016, at which point only twenty-four JCTAWS 
and ten IEMC reports existed. 
53 All JCTAWS and IEMC reports are either unclassified, for official use only (U//FOUO) or 
unclassified, law enforcement sensitive (U//LES). These are not made available to the general public. The 
information related to these sources contained within this thesis, however, has been approved for public 
release. 
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C. JCTAWS AND IEMC OVERVIEW AND COMPARISON 
JCTAWS and IEMC are two federally available training programs that 
holistically prepare state and local first responders and government leaders, and private 
sector partners, for a CCA.54 Since the inception of JCTAWS, over thirty trainings have 
been completed across the United States.55 Each program is managed by federal 
employees from a variety of agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, 
FEMA, National Counterterrorism Center, FBI, and also state and local agencies. While 
the programs have similarities, they also have differences.  
D. JCTAWS 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Homeland 
Security, and FBI sponsor and support JCTAWS. These agencies identify key cities 
within the United States to participate in the exercise. During each workshop, federal 
partners assemble a team of experts—the interagency planning group—that has unique 
areas of expertise to develop a phased attack based on current intelligence and the 
regional assessment of capabilities and response policies. During the exercise delivery, 
the interagency planning group engages the stakeholders, develops a delivery package 
that suits the needs of the host jurisdiction, and provides a final report to the host city.56 
JCTAWS involves and assesses the whole community, including law 
enforcement, fire and rescue, the public health and medical system, and emergency 
management to test and exercise the effectiveness of current local plans and policies 
against a simulated Mumbai-style attack in the host jurisdiction.57 Prior to each JCTAWS 
event, the host agency is provided with a self-assessment matrix (in the form of a survey) 
to complete with the goal of identifying potential gaps in or barriers that the JCTAWS 
team can address during the scenario. As part of the questionnaire, participants are asked 
                                                 
54 Other federal and private programs and courses do exist; however, they do not solely concentrate on 
CCAs. Examples include the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
Mobile Education Team, DHS Office of Bombing Prevention, and DHS Active Shooter training.  
55 NCTC, DHS, and FBI, “JCTAWS Summary Report.” 
56 NCTC, DHS, and FBI. 
57 FEMA, “2016 Complex Coordinated Attack Post-workshop Evaluation: JCTAWS & IEMC 
Training (2011–2016)” (report, FEMA, 2017). 
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about a variety of plans, capabilities, and policies. This two-day program requires months 
of planning and coordination between the JCTAWS planning team and the host 
jurisdiction. A detailed, and in some ways unique, table-top exercise is developed for the 
host jurisdiction based on threat information and an assessment of the host agency 
questionnaire. 
A typical scenario mirrors a CCA, by definition, containing multi-team, multi-
site, and multi-weapons systems or attack modes. Participants are exposed to a variety of 
“injects,” such as suspicious activity around a critical infrastructure, a 911 call for a 
person with a gun at a mall, or a large protest. JCTAWS staff inject larger scenarios, such 
as the report of a vehicle-borne IED or a person shooting into a crowd. Participants 
typically experience around five significant injects to test local policies and emergency 
operations plans. 
At the conclusion of the two-day exercise, the JCTAWS staff provides the local 
agencies with a summary report of the training, the scenario, and the gaps identified by 
the participants.58 The summary report contains numerous sections that validate the 
importance of the program, and it serves as a reference for participants. In general, the 
following sections are included in the summary report: 
• Section 1—executive summary 
• Section 2—introduction 
• Section 3—workshop overview 
• Section 4—workshop design 
• Section 5—capability gap matrix 
• Section 6—feedback summary 
• Section 7—conclusion 
                                                 
58 NCTC, DHS, and FBI, “JCTAWS Summary Report.” 
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A variety of appendices highlight breakout group results, participant feedback, 
and a list of acronyms. The capability gap matrix (see Appendix Table 1) is a 
comprehensive review of host agency shortcomings identified prior to the exercise (by 
self-assessment) or observed by the JCTAWS staff during the training. The matrix also 
provides a cross-examination of the core capabilities, mitigation strategies, capability 
elements, and federal resources that could be used by the local agency to mitigate the 
gap. This research did not measure or inquire as to the benefit of these resources or if 
participants utilize them.  
Analysis of twenty-four JCTAWS summary reports indicates that each delivery 
has the same objectives, and includes59 
• Review existing preparedness, response, and interdiction plans, policies, 
and procedures related to a complex coordinated attack. 
• Identify gaps in plans, operational capabilities, response resources, and 
authorities. 
• Identify federal, state, and local resources, including federal grants, 
training, exercises, and technical assistance available to address potential 
gaps in capabilities. 
• Improve whole community situational awareness, recognize best practices, 
and encourage information sharing among all stakeholders in the event of 
a complex terrorist attack. 
• Examine the healthcare system and clinical challenges unique to a CCA 
that employs small arms and explosives. 
• Examine the roles of the community and bystanders in a complex terrorist 
attack. 
                                                 
59 The twenty-four reports analyzed are federal government property and classified as unclassified/for 
official use only (U//FOUO). The information related to these sources contained within this thesis, 
however, has been approved for public release. 
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• Discuss frameworks and existing protocols for immediate medical 
management of the wounded in or near an attack site. 
• Identify and share best practices and lessons learned from the case studies 
in medical preparedness and response. 
E. IEMC 
The IEMC course is sponsored by FEMA; while its framework is similar to 
JCTAWS, the audience is broader and the delivery is more diverse. Unlike JCTAWS, 
IEMC is a four-day program that occurs either at the Emergency Management Institute 
National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland, or remotely within the 
host municipality. The target audience for IEMC is communities with a population of at 
least 100,000, and the course relies on the participation of state and local government 
officials, first responders, emergency managers, public health workers, and other 
residents who have a role in responding to a CCA.60 The background work prior to the 
IEMC diverges from JCTAWS and includes a pre-site visit by IEMC staff prior to the 
course to review policies, plans, and development of the scenario. In addition, IEMC staff 
meets with each first responder discipline in order to identify gaps and problematic areas 
within the plans and policies. 
During the four days of IEMC, participants are exposed to a variety of briefings, 
case studies, and focused group discussions. As part of this course model, the program 
encourages intra-discipline dialogue, but also enables cross-discipline networking to 
enhance the discussion and problem-solving potential. The IEMC course does include a 
CCA scenario and IEMC staff foster a non-attribution environment to support more 
communication between stakeholders. 
Similar to JCTAWS, IEMC host agencies are provided with a summary report, 
which includes a summary of findings, capability gap matrix, and a variety of appendices. 
                                                 
60 FEMA, “Course: E/L0912—Preparing Communities for a Complex Coordinated Attack IEMC: 
Community Specific,” DHS, October 14, 2015, https://training.fema.gov/emigrams/2015/1201%20-
%20training%20opportunity%20-%20e-l%200912%20cca%20-%20fy%202016.pdf?d=10/14/2015. 
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Analysis of eleven IEMC reports indicates that each delivery has the same goals and 
objectives: 
IEMC Goals 
• Identify interdependencies and gaps in decisions, actions, and resources 
needed to respond to a CCA. 
• Increase situational awareness to inform the community of the challenges 
faced by healthcare systems during a CCA. 
• Increase understanding of how to involve the whole community in 
response to a CCA. 
• Develop a strategy for creating a regional plan for response to a CCA. 
IEMC Objectives 
• Review preparedness and response policies and plans. 
• Discover operational and resource gaps. 
• Assess the healthcare and emergency medical system challenges. 
• Examine incident command and coordination capabilities and challenges. 
• Recognize and share best practices from previous attack responses. 
F. ANALYSIS OF JCTAWS AND IEMC SUMMARY REPORTS 
Throughout the qualitative analysis process, all data was examined within the 
thirty-four summary reports. The main concentration of data was extracted from the 
capability gap matrix section, which was either a direct observation by JCTAWS or 
IEMC staff during the exercise or during the self-assessment review process. In total, 782 
gaps were identified from the thirty-four JCTAWS and IEMC summary reports. On 
average, each agency reported twenty-four gaps relating to a variety of core areas, and the 
following represent the areas with the most highly identified gaps: 
 21 
• emergency operations center 
• integrated operations 
• incident command 
• communication (internal and external) 
• intelligence/information sharing 
• resource management. 
The capability gap matrix links each gap from the JCTAWS or IEMC report to a 
federal core capability described within the NPG. The core capabilities are general 
competencies that serve as a guide to state and local municipalities. The latest version, 
from 2015, states that the nation’s “security and resiliency posture” is built upon the 
foundation and sustainment of core capabilities.61 Each core capability is interdependent 
and can evolve to address emerging homeland security challenges.62 The core 
capabilities (found in Appendix Table 2) are subordinate to the five mission areas: 
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.63 
Specific to JCTAWS, the consistent core capabilities assessed include  
• Primary: intelligence and information sharing, interdiction and 
disruption, operational communications, operational coordination, public 
health and medical services, public information and warning, situational 
assessment; and 
• Secondary: access control and identify verification, fatality management 
services, forensics and attribution, infrastructure systems, mass care 
services, and on-scene security and protection.  
 
                                                 
61 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
62 DHS. 
63 DHS, National Preparedness Report. 
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IEMC, however, assesses 
• Primary: intelligence and information sharing, medical preparedness and 
response, operational communications, operational coordination, public 
information and community response, and 
• Secondary: fatality management services, forensics and attribution, 
infrastructure systems, mass care services, and on-scene security and 
protection. 
Comparatively, JCTAWS assesses the municipality with more emphasis on 
situational assessment, access control and identify verification, and infrastructure 
systems. However, both JCTAWS and IEMC assess core capabilities such as interdiction 
and disruption, public health, and medical preparedness and response. The programs 
appear to diverge in the process selection of participant municipalities. The JCTAWS 
process is sensitive and therefore is not able to be shared with the general public. 
However, the information within the twenty-four JCTAWS summary reports indicates 
that participant jurisdictions are major metropolitan areas.64 The IEMC staff selects a 
jurisdiction after it applies and is scored on a variety of elements. Chiefly, jurisdictions 
are assessed and measured based upon the likelihood of both the threat and consequence. 
The IEMC assessment measures four core areas on a scale from one to five: population, 
threat (based upon a restricted assessment), national events, and population density. 
Applications can receive extra points if other increased factors are present, such as a 
major critical infrastructure (transportation hub, port), support infrastructure (required 
support due to isolation or support that crosses state lines), recent non-natural disaster, 
and a concentration of collegiate institutions. Appendix Table 3 illustrates both the core 
area and increased factors scoring matrix. 
                                                 
64 For the purposes of this thesis, a major metropolitan area is categorized by population and is within 
the top 100 largest cities in the United States. 
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1. Key Themes—JCTAWS 
For the purposes of this section, twenty-four summary reports were qualitatively 
analyzed for common themes. Each report covers one iteration of a JCTAWS course, 
which includes the summary assessment by the JCTAWS that identifies the capabilities 
and gaps of the subject municipality. The numbered list items throughout this section 
present the most important findings that relate to CCA strategic planning and 
preparedness. 
1. Of the twenty-four JCTAWS summary reports analyzed, 91 percent 
(n=22) did not have a unified plan, which also includes a multi-discipline 
response and multi-agency coordination plan, to respond to a CCA. The 
NPR highlights the necessity for a unified plan throughout all five core 
capabilities and encourages communities to “establish and maintain a 
unified and coordinated operational structure and process that 
appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution 
of core capabilities.”65 
2. In each of the twenty-four reports, first responders indicated that they 
lacked one or more of the following: enhanced high-threat training to 
respond efficiently to a CCA, joint-integrated training with other public 
safety disciplines, policy and understanding of roles, and advanced 
medical training (Multi-assault Counterterrorism Action Training, Tactical 
Emergency Casualty Care, and Paramilitary Attack Counter Offensive 
Plan). 
The second finding is important because it suggests that there may be barriers or 
operational deficiencies that inhibit joint-integrated training. Although the strategy of 
joint first responder training is not new, it remains a significant challenge. In 2013, 
FEMA recognized that in order to “increase survivability of victims,” first responder 
                                                 
65 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 6, 9, 11, 14, 18. 
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public safety agencies must plan and train together.66 In a 2014 Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, Keith Johnson recommended that first responder agencies “develop and 
implement regularly established joint training and exercises” in order to increase 
familiarization in cross-discipline policy, capability and equipment.67  
3. Thirty-three percent of reports indicated that formal mutual aid 
agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between public 
safety agencies and regional partners are non-existent. Rationally, this 
finding could also imply that 67 percent of JCTAWS jurisdictions did 
have some form of a mutual aid or MOU, though it is not within the scope 
of this thesis to determine this holistically. However, it can be assumed 
that the need for MOUs and mutual aid agreements is important to state 
and local jurisdictions. 
The concept of MOUs and mutual aid agreements is highlighted in two 
documents, the 9/11 Commission Report and the NPG. The 9/11 Commission Report 
states: 
Public safety organizations, chief administrative officers, state emergency 
management agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security should 
develop a regional focus within the emergency responder community and 
promote multi-jurisdictional mutual assistance compacts. Where such 
compacts already exist, training by their terms should be required.68 
Comparatively, the NPG urges mutual aid and MOUs under the response mission area 
and guides jurisdictions to “establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational 
structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports 
the execution of core capabilities.”69 Absent a public safety or regional MOU or mutual 
                                                 
66 FEMA, “Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for 
Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents” (white paper, U.S. Fire Administration, 2013), 4, 
https://www.everyonegoeshome.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/04/active_shooter_guide.pdf.  
67 Keith H. Johnson, “Changing the Paradigm: Implementation of Combined Law Enforcement, Fire, 
and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Cross-disciplinary Response to Hostile Events” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 91, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA620912.  
68 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 397. 
69 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 14. 
 25 
aid plan, states can request assistance from other states through the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact.70 
4. Fifty-four percent of the reports indicated that there are gaps in regional 
mass-casualty incident (MCI)/medical coordination plans, or that they do 
not exist. Conventional MCI plans prescribe the rapid response of a large 
number of emergency services resources to the scene of a disaster, large 
accident, or domestic terrorism event. An MCI is traditionally inclusive of 
emergency responders, emergency transport vehicles, and hospitals. When 
an MCI plan is activated, first responders conduct functional tasks such as 
triage, treatment, transportation, and hospital coordination. Having no 
MCI plan in place could result in increased treatment and transportation 
times, increased morbidity, and increased coordination with hospitals and 
law enforcement agencies.71 
A 2013 report by the Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical 
Services found similar problems with the implementation of local MCI plans. The 
analysis, based upon a national emergency medical services (EMS) assessment, found 
that 72 percent of respondents had only developed an EMS-specific mass casualty plan, 
and just 38 percent of those respondents stated the ideas were implemented.72 The 
benefits from an MCI plan were exemplified during the 2015 San Bernardino shooting, 
when fire and EMS personnel were able to triage, treat, and transport all victims in just 
under fifteen minutes.73 
                                                 
70 DHS, National Response Framework, 29. 
71 Brian A. Jackson, Kay Sullivan Faith, and Henry H. Willis, Evaluating the Reliability of Emergency 
Response Systems for Large-Scale Incident Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). 
72 FICEMS, “National Implementation of the Model Uniform Core Criteria for Mass Casualty Incident 
Triage” (prepublication document, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2013), 5, 
https://www.ems.gov/nemsac/dec2013/FICEMS-MUCC-Implementation-Plan.pdf. 
73 Rick Braziel et al., Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino 
Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting at the Inland Regional Center 
(Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2016). 
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2. Key Themes—IEMC  
1. Of the ten reports analyzed, 80 percent (n=8) of course participants stated 
that their community lacked a unified response framework for a CCA.  
This percentage is slightly lower but within the range of the JCTAWS finding regarding a 
unified response plan.  
2. Two findings are similar—100 percent of reports stated that municipalities 
lacked a plan to manage the potential for first responder self-convergence 
to the scene of a CCA, and 50 percent (n=5) of reports stated that 
municipalities either lack a formal first responder or medical recall plan, 
or that the plans had not been updated or tested. 
The goal of a self-convergence or recall plan is to control first responders from deploying 
or arriving to a scene without specific direction or without first being requested. A self-
convergence policy may define a protocol for the communication and recall off-duty 
staff, or perhaps outline mutual aid assets. The 2008 National Response Framework 
suggests that coordination of response actions is a baseline priority and that such 
responses to incidents are activities that occur through structures, and assigned roles and 
responsibilities.74 
3. First responder disciplines indicated that joint training on high-threat 
response and other critical areas such as incident command, unified 
command, and multi-agency coordination are insufficient or lacking. 
This finding is on target with the JCTAWS findings. The National Response Framework 
suggests that partnerships are essential to preparedness and that activities should be 
coordinated across disciplines and jurisdictions.75 
4. Eighty percent (n=8) of reports indicate that the response team lacks 
regional plans for a mass casualty incident, that an existing plan is 
outdated, or that there is no formal hospital coordination plan. 
                                                 
74 DHS, National Response Framework. 
75 DHS. 
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Although this percentage is higher than in the JCTAWS findings, a reasonable inference 
is that JCTAWS participating jurisdictions are greater in size and have more capability. 
However, the benefits of a regional MCI plan and hospital coordination plan are vital to 
patient transport and treatment, as well as to the management of the incident. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Of the thirty-four JCTAWS and IEMC jurisdictions analyzed, 90 percent (n=30) 
did not have a multi-agency unified response plan to address CCAs. This is problematic 
for two reasons. First, federal guidance has suggested the need for such a plan, and 
second, after-action reports have highlighted success stories involving unified response 
plans during real incidents. From the federal level, the Gilmore Commission 
recommended that “there should be a national level strategy on combating terrorism that 
clearly delineates and distinguishes Federal, state, and local roles and responsibilities and 
articulates clear direction for Federal priorities and programs to support local responders; 
and a comprehensive, parallel public education effort.”76 At the state and local level, 
prior to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, federal, state, and local agencies trained 
and collaborated for months. In the months leading up to the race, the Boston area 
participated in a “comprehensive, multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary” planning 
process.77 Specific to the unified response plans and preparedness, the final report on the 
marathon bombing incident applauded success and best practices in the pre-development 
of relationships among leaders, integrated public safety activities before the event, and 
participation in multi-jurisdictional exercises. 
Chapter III assesses participant progress and preparedness one to six years after 
the JCTAWS or IEMC program. This assessment, in the form of an online anonymous 
survey, adds value to Chapter II and helps answer the research questions. 
                                                 
76 Susan B. Epstein, US Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 8. 
77 Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency et al., “After Action Report for the Response to the 
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III. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESULTS 




To measure the impact and advancement of the JCTAWS and IEMC programs’ 
findings and recommendations, the author developed a voluntary survey for past 
participants of each program. The survey, entitled “JCTAWS/IEMC Participant Survey,” 
was designed to reach the state and local point of contact (POC) involved in the planning 
process for JCTAWS or IEMC. The POCs have a major role in the coordination of 
logistics and program development for each respective JCTAWS or IEMC delivery and 
are either in the law enforcement, fire service, or emergency management field for a 
particular jurisdiction. These contacts were obtained through FEMA and remained 
anonymous throughout the study. The survey was designed to gain better insight into 
perception of the overall program, ways to improve each program, and specific barriers to 
fulfilling the findings and recommendations provided by the JCTAWS or IEMC team. 
Furthermore, the survey assessed the POCs’ perceptions and observations about their 
agency’s progress or lack of progress toward implementing action to address the 
recommendations. 
The survey was created and delivered through Lime Survey, an approved Naval 
Postgraduate School Enterprise Survey tool. This tool allows both the questions and 
responses to remain secure within the Naval Postgraduate School server, which 
ultimately protects the information and data within the survey. The survey was built so 
that the participants remained anonymous in order to produce better-quality answers. In 
sum, no names or Internet Protocol identifiers were collected or requested. Exercising the 
list of contacts obtained through FEMA, the Lime Survey link was shared through an 
invitational email. Within the email, each contact was added to the blind courtesy copy 
section, so that no participant could see who else was participating. This method also 
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protected the invitees should a participant forward the email to another person; due to the 
anonymous and voluntary nature of the survey, it is not known if this occurred. As 
indicated in the email invitation, selecting the provided link indicated agreement to 
participate in the survey. 
In total, forty-one state and local POCs were contacted via email and provided 
with an explanation for and link to the survey. It is important to note that a wide variety 
of public safety participants attend each JCTAWS or IEMC delivery, including law 
enforcement, firefighters, emergency managers, public health/healthcare providers, and 
government and private sector partners. This survey did not measure every attendee from 
each JCTAWS or IEMC, although doing so would have provided a better assessment and 
yielded a higher number of responses. Therefore, this survey was limited by jurisdictional 
scope, as the JCTAWS deliveries studied involved up to fifty-nine different agencies.78 
In other words, because large numbers of agencies work together during the exercises, 
the results reflect the program delivery’s dynamic, and the need for involvement from a 
variety of resources and skillsets when jurisdictions prepare for and respond to a CCA. 
However, many of the POCs contacted to participate in the survey remain involved in 
regional first responder programs and preparedness activities.  
The survey contained fifteen questions designed to assess the JCTAWS or IEMC 
program’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as barriers and gaps identified after the 
exercise conclusion. Participants were asked to rate their experiences with the course and 
to articulate their successes and struggles when addressing the various gaps from the 
JCTAWS or IEMC report. The survey was composed of multiple-choice questions, some 
of which allowed the participants to include comments; yes-or-no questions; questions 
that asked the participants to indicate a value rating from low to high; and questions that 
evaluated positive or negative changes in preparedness and resiliency.  
The survey questions were developed on May 5, 2017, and approved by the Naval 
Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board on June 28, 2017. On July 10, 2017, the 
                                                 
78 The Washington, DC, JCTAWS involved fifty-nine organizations from Washington, DC, Maryland, 
and Virginia; participants were local first responders, as well as representatives from various federal 
agencies and private-sector businesses.  
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first email was delivered to forty-one email contacts, and recipients began adding data 
and comments to the survey that same day. The survey link expired on July 31, 2017, and 
all data were archived for analysis and secured on the Naval Postgraduate School server. 
B. PARTICIPANT SURVEY ANALYSIS 
The survey was available to participants for twenty-two days and generated 
twenty-six responses, which means 63.4 percent of the intended number of recipients 
completed the survey. However, out of the twenty-six responses, only fifteen (57.6 
percent) completed the entire survey. The other twelve responses were either partially 
completed (n=9, or 34.6%), or the link was selected, and the participant did not go further 
than the first question (n=3, or 11.5%). The rest of this section contains a discussion and 
analysis of the responses. 
The initial part of the survey included a demographics section that asked the 
following questions: 
• What discipline is your agency? 
• Which other disciplines were represented in the JCTAWS/IEMC program 
that you participated in? (Participants selected from fire department, police 
department/sheriffs, emergency medical services, emergency 
management, public health/healthcare, government/elected official, and 
private sector). 
• Aside from the JCTAWS or IEMC program, what other programs have 
your agency or jurisdiction participated in that address the preparedness of 
asymmetrical threats? (Participants selected any of the following: FBI 
active shooter program, Office for Bombing Prevention courses, other 
FEMA courses, private-sector training; there was also a comment box for 
participants to indicate programs not listed). 
These three demographics questions were designed to establish a baseline for the 
research project and gain additional insight into the POC, other participating first 
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responder disciplines, and their level of exposure to other federal preparedness programs. 
The purpose of measuring these demographic areas was to assess the disciplines that are 
involved in the JCTAWS and IEMC training courses. First, the author wanted to know 
which disciplines the POCs represented and if there were patterns of under- or over-
representation. This is relevant from a planning perspective because the POCs could, 
perhaps, influence the course trajectory, which creates an unintended outcome that 
challenges one discipline and fails to take another into account. Evaluating the 
participant’s discipline, and which disciplines were represented, qualifies or validates the 
unified mission of JCTAWS and IEMC. Lastly, the author assessed whether the 
jurisdiction had some exposure to other federal courses. Although the selections within 
the survey were limited, the results could yield some interesting data points. For example, 
is it predictable if a jurisdiction that has completed other courses designed to enhance 
preparedness, is better situated or results in a smaller number of gaps? 
1. Question 1 
What discipline is your agency? 
Question 1 established a participation baseline for each state and local discipline 
in order to determine differences in responses. Of the twenty-six participants, 88 percent 
(n=23) completed this question. Two responses resulted from the “other” category, which 
was a comment box and not reflected in the findings shown in Figure 1. These responses 
indicated that one participant was from a “regional multi-discipline taskforce” that 
includes “law enforcement, fire department, emergency medical services, etc.” The other 
response indicated that the participant was from a “fire department based emergency 
management” system. 
The responses were as expected except for one factor: emergency management. In 
developing this question, the author did not predict that emergency management POCs 
would be heavily represented because emergency management may be limited by 
baseline capabilities, namely prevention, protection, and response. The author expected 
higher numbers for traditional first responder disciplines simply because they have a 
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more traditional role in emergency response and incident management.79 The author’s 
assumption is that the emergency management agencies that participated in JCTAWS or 
IEMC were in a better position to manage the programs when compared to other first 
responders. 
 
Figure 1.  Question 1: Agency Disciplines 
2. Question 2 
Which other disciplines were represented in the JCTAWS or IEMC 
program that you participated in? (Select all that apply). 
This question established the number and types of disciplines that participated in 
each respective program. Of the twenty-six participants, 92 percent (n=24) answered this 
question. The results (see Figure 2) indicate that a majority of first responder participants 
(90 percent) come from the law enforcement, EMS, and emergency management 
disciplines, followed by (76 percent) the fire and public health/healthcare disciplines. 
Four additional separate responses in the “other” category included: schools, legal (U.S. 
attorney, district attorney, city attorney), volunteer agencies, and non-governmental 
agencies (not specific).  
                                                 
79 This observation is based upon the author’s twenty-five years’ experience in the fire and rescue 
services. Northern Virginia Emergency Management systems, for example, are not considered emergency 
response functions. However, they have responded to the scene for large campaign events, or responded to 
their respective emergency operations center. 
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The responses to this question were not unanticipated, although none of the 
responses indicated the inclusion of military or National Guard. In both the Mumbai and 
Paris attacks, the military had a major role in neutralizing the threat and restoring order to 
the cities. Additionally, military assets can also support incident command, armored 
vehicles, air evacuation and surveillance, and more. 
 
Figure 2.  Question 2: Other Disciplines Represented during Program Exercise 
3. Question 3 
Aside from the JCTAWS or IEMC program, what other programs have 
your agency or jurisdiction participated in that address preparedness and 
resiliency for asymmetrical threats? 
This question measured the POC’s access to and participation in various federal 
and private-sector programs that address terrorism preparedness at the state and local 
level. Twenty-four respondents indicated that the majority of training has occurred within 
available FEMA courses, although there was no specificity as to which courses the 
answers represent. One response in the “other” category indicated that the respondent’s 
agency has participated in Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training 
(ALERRT), held at Texas State University, which focuses on active shooter response and 
mandates that attendees are law enforcement officers. The second respondent indicated 
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that he or she had received fusion center training. Figure 3 shows the response 
breakdown. 
Two data points are noteworthy. First, the FEMA courses available to state and 
local agencies cover a wide array of opportunities; state and local first responders attend 
these courses to enhance their capability to prepare for and respond to a variety of 
threats.80 The data point relating to private-sector training is therefore surprising. 
Although the actual private-sector courses were not measured or provided in this 
research, this finding is certainly important to explore if similar federal courses are 
available at no cost to the state and local agencies. It is possible that the private-sector 
courses have identified some needs of state and local first responders that are beyond the 
scope of the federal programs. 
 
Figure 3.  Question 3: Other Programs 
The following questions probed the pre-program activities specific to the 
identification of gaps and actions before JCTAWS or IEMC delivery.  
                                                 
80 “Emergency Management Institute (EMI): National Preparedness Directorate National Training and 
Education Division,” FEMA, accessed October 9, 2017, https://training.fema.gov/training. 
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4. Question 4 
Prior to the JCTAWS or IEMC delivery, was your agency or jurisdiction 
aware of the gaps or issues outlined in the findings and 
recommendations? 
This question queried the participants about their awareness of gaps and barriers 
relating to CCA preparedness before attending JCTAWS or IEMC. Of the twenty-six 
participants, 65 percent (n=17) answered this question with “yes” and 31 percent (n=8) 
reported that they either were not aware, or were unsure if they were aware before the 
program; nine chose not to answer the question (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  Question 4: Prior Awareness of Gaps 
5. Question 5 
Relating to question #4, were these gaps identified in the self-assessment? 
This question was designed to add value to the previous question by identifying 
when the gaps or findings were discovered. More specifically, this question attempted to 
determine whether the gaps were identified during the self-assessment phase before the 
JCTAWS or IEMC, or in some other way. The results indicate that 46 percent (n=12) 
discovered the gaps during the self-assessment, whereas 19 percent (n=5) learned of the 
gaps during the official findings and recommendations report; nine participants chose not 
to answer the question (see Figure 5). 
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Questions #4 and #5 are positively correlated. Accordingly, in question #4, four 
respondents indicated that they were not aware of the gaps prior to the JCTAWS or 
IEMC. This matches question #5 and the number of respondents (n=5) that discovered 
gaps only in the summary report. Therefore, this highlights the worth of both the self-
assessment prior to the JCTAWS or IEMC course, and the exercise that is designed to 
test and examine local policies and procedures. 
 
Figure 5.  Question 5: Gaps Identified in Self-assessment 
6. Question 6 
Relating to question #5, if you answered yes or no, please indicate your 
actions prior to JCTAWS or IEMC that you addressed, or attempted to 
address. 
This question extracts the municipality’s specific actions toward addressing, or 
not addressing, gaps discovered before the JCTAWS or IEMC.   
While the responses represent the entirety of the responses, surprisingly the 
participants did not use terms that might be found in or as part of a CCA incident, such as 
preparedness, IED, complex, mitigate, and attack. Words such as CCA, coordination, 
training, shooter, and unified were mentioned only one to three times throughout the 
responses. Moreover, “response,” a baseline capability, was the most-used term, and yet 
the word “preparedness,” the ultimate goal, was not mentioned once.  
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The following are examples of a wide variety of participants’ answers relating to 
actions taken prior to JCTAWS or IEMC. For coding purposes, each response is 
categorized by the discipline (FD=fire service, PD=police/sherrif, EM=emergency 
management, TF=multi-agency task force) followed by the sequential number 
representing the order in which the respondent answered (i.e., FD01 was a fire 
department member and the first to return the survey). 
• TF03—“No actions prior to JCTAWS other than active shooter training. 
Our focus is on integrated emergency response” and the task force has 
“bought into the concept of Rescue Task Force.” 
• EM05—“Hosted multiple terrorism, active shooter, [Rescue Task Force] 
courses, and countywide tabletop and functional drills.” 
• EM08—“Coordination and communication between government and 
private sector”; “MCI Response and social media challenges.” 
• FD11—“Warm zone integration, tactical EMS, and unified command.” 
• EM14—“Training, Planning, Purchasing equipment, Conducting gap 
analysis, and Exercises (Table top & Full-Scale) all related to a CCA 
event.” 
• FD16—“Serious conversations about an interdisciplinary program to 
allow for a more collaborative effort.” 
• EM22—“Integrated response to high-threat incidents, medical surge, 
equipment needs for specialized teams, alert and warning/mass 
notification systems.” 
• EM26—“DHS capability assessment in conjunction with the Protective 
Security Advisor (PSA) on critical infrastructure assessment.” 
 39 
It is important to note that the survey did not assess the effectiveness or status of 
actions taken prior to JCTAWS or IEMC, or if those actions taken were positive or 
negative. 
The following questions targeted the JCTAWS or IEMC program; participants 
were asked to answer specific questions about the respective course. 
7. Question 7 
Please indicate how challenging the scenario was for your agency or 
jurisdiction of the JCTAWS/IEMC program. (1 not challenging, 5 very 
challenging).  
This question intended to determine if the JCTAWS or IEMC scenario was 
representative of a CCA and measure the level of difficulty for the participant. The 
results show that seventeen of the twenty-six respondents answered this question. Also, 
29 percent (n=5) found the JCTAWS or IEMC scenario challenging and scored this 
question a five, while the majority, 46 percent (n=8) selected the next lower answer, four 
out of five. Just over 23 percent scored this question a three, which represents the median 
between “challenging” and “not challenging.” Fifty-two percent (n=9) chose not to 
complete this question. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of responses. 
The answers within each category were expected. Both JCTAWS and IEMC 
develop scenarios that are designed to significantly strain and challenge the local first 
responder community in order to identify challenges and gaps before a CCA occurs. 
Moreover, this signifies that a CCA will be challenging for most major cities and 
municipalities, but also presumably that the JCTAWS and IEMC training was valuable 
because it addressed major challenges experienced in Paris and Mumbai, for example. 
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Figure 6.  Question 7: Program Level of Difficulty 
8. Question 8 
Please rate the value of the JCTAWS/IEMC program and findings to your 
agency or jurisdiction (1 low, 5 high). 
This question measured the value and usefulness of the JCTAWS or IEMC 
program. Of the seventeen responses, 76 percent (n=13) indicated that the program 
(JCTAWS or IEMC) was of high value. The balance of responses, 24 percent (n=4) 
ranked it a “four” (see Figure 7)  
The answers to this question and the next draw a direct parallel between the 
program delivery and its importance to the state and local agency. The participants view 




Figure 7.  Question 8: Program Value 
9. Question 9 
Please rate the comprehensiveness (relative to your threat landscape and 
capabilities) of the JCTAWS/IEMC program (1 low, 5 high). 
This question measured the content and scope of each course. A large majority of 
respondents, 76 percent (n=13), indicated that the course was of “high 
comprehensiveness,” followed by 18 percent who selected a “four” (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.  Question 9: Program Comprehensiveness 
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10. Question 10 
Did you have any follow-up discussion with the JCTAWS or IEMC 
program course staff after the course delivery? 
This question assessed the level of communication once the program delivery was 
complete and the findings and recommendations were shared with the state and local 
agency. The answers were limited to “yes” or “no.” Assessing post-program 
communication levels can explain the existence of post-program activities and federal 
support. The findings indicate that 71 percent of respondents (n=17) received some form 
of communication after the program (See Figure 9). It is not known whether the 
71 percent were from JCTAWS or IEMC. 
However, almost 30 percent (n=5) of respondents indicated that they had no 
follow-up with either the JCTAWS or IEMC program staff. If follow-up is part of the 
JCTAWS or IEMC programing, then few (if no) respondents should have chosen this 
option.  
 




11. Question 11 
What would you change or enhance about the JCTAWS or IEMC 
program? What would you change and why? 
Seventeen participants answered this question. To effectively capture each 
response, separate coding/sections were developed to place each response within a major 
category.  
Addressing Gaps 
• FD16—“Once jurisdictions are shown gaps, provide best practice for 
addressing the identified gaps.” 
Program Specific 
• EM22—“Tailor scenario more to jurisdictional reality.” 
• EM14—“EMC—restructure awareness level modules from the program. 
These were very basic for a number of our personnel.” 
“JCTAWS—Increase breakout sessions length. Many good discussions 
were brought up in these sessions. Additional time might have helped 
address issues identified.” 
• EM07—“I would’ve liked more interaction with NCTC to understand 
their role and how they can help.” 
• EM08—“I feel this is well done and benefits the locals. One thing I would 
add is once a participant is added to a working group that they receive an 
email explaining the reason they are in that group. We found first 
responders not understanding why they were in for example the hospital 
group. This caused them to just go to another group.” 
• EM03—“Possibly make it an additional day longer to start the [after-
action review] process.” 
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• EM05—“Great program. We were the pilot program and that was back in 
2014. Has most likely changed since then.” 
Collaboration/Involvement 
• TF03—“Active shooter is simply the ‘problem du jour’ and frankly this 
will pass. We believe the greater challenge in getting our primary response 
disciplines to fully integrate their ops (i.e., starts with playing nice 
together). Integrated response ops have much more utility and application 
that goes well beyond the coordinated, complex attack scenario, and 
impacts our day-to-day responses in the all-hazards world. In short—it’s 
win / win.” 
• PD23—“I think the program is great. I do wish more of our local 
representatives involved in planning had responded with detailed 
information during the planning process but that is our own issue.” 
• FD10—“Bring in more municipal government departments that are not 
normally emergency services; highway, PIO, and recreation.” 
Funding/Capability 
• EM26—“Although the briefing was specific to our jurisdiction and truly 
eye-opening, it did not provide funding/grant resources. For local 
jurisdictions, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to address 
capability gaps in light of diminishing and/or level funding while the 
effects of major disasters and other emergencies continues to increase.” 
• PD09—“Funding. Host agencies were responsible for the bulk of the 
funding.” 




• PD04—“I would not change or enhance the JCTAWS program. It was just 
right for our community.” 
• FD06—“None.” 
Most responses were cosmetic in nature and ranged from a need to involve more 
of the community and non–first responders to objective recommendations to enhance 
either program. Two key areas stand out as important and are addressed within this 
thesis: funding and support to address gaps after the program.  
12. Question 12 
Has your agency or jurisdiction implemented any JCTAWS or IEMC 
findings and recommendations? 
This question assessed whether the state and local agency has made progress 
related to the findings and recommendations from the JCTAWS or IEMC course. A total 
of fifteen responses were collected, and only two respondents answered the question 
thoroughly with either some gaps addressed, or specific numbers of identified gaps 
addressed. However, 80 percent (n=12) of the respondents indicated that they had 
implemented JCTAWS or IEMC findings and recommendations, while 20 percent (n=3) 
reported that there were barriers or contributing factors (i.e., funding, resistance to 
change, protocol) that did not allow implementation (see Figure 10). Some of the 
responses indicated that progress was being made, including in the following areas: 
• PD04—“Suspicious Activity Reporting, Unified Response Plan, and 
Tactical Emergency Casualty Care training.” 
• EM14—“Findings were added to a comprehensive improvement plan 
matrix that is used during all exercises.” 
• PD23—“Development of a fusion center and agreements for joint police 
and fire department training.” 
Although most of these answers were in the “yes” category, it is surprising that 
most respondents were not able to articulate the number of gaps that had been addressed 
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within the summary report. In theory, even if the agency had addressed one gap, the POC 
could have answered “yes.” However, it would have been helpful to also measure the 
number of gaps to a specific jurisdiction as well as the number of gaps completed or 
process to show progression. 
 
Figure 10.  Question 12: Recommendation Implementation 
13. Question 13 
What effect has the JCTAWS or IEMC program had on your agency or 
jurisdiction’s resiliency (ability to adapt to changing conditions and 
withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies)? 
As part of the research, the author wanted to gauge not just preparedness, but how 
state and local first responders were able to maintain a level of resiliency during the 
incident. In theory, this question would have measured the resiliency of an agency based 
on both a baseline capability and an exercise or real-world conflict. In reality, this 
question was posed and answered on the assumption that resiliency was factored and 
measured by the participant. Fifteen participants responded to this question, and 
60 percent (n=9) of them stated that JCTAWS or IEMC had a positive impact and 
resulted in increased resiliency. One respondent, or 7 percent, reported a negative effect 
and no change in resiliency, while another respondent indicated a neutral perspective. 
Figure 11 shows the response breakdown. 
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The answers provided here do not match up to the previous answers in 
question #12. Resiliency, in sum, is the ability to adapt and rapidly recover from 
disruption. A majority of respondents in question #12 answered that they had addressed 
gaps found within the summary report. However, none of the answers suggested 
implementation or application of resiliency measures. A possible explanation for this 
problem is that the respondents feel that they are more resilient because they attended the 
JCTAWS or IEMC course. Assessing first responder resilience could be a thesis in and of 
itself. The limitation to this problem, however, is that the participants may have only 
assessed their resiliency through an administrative exercise, rather than through an 
emergency incident that that truly evaluates ability to rapidly recover from disruption. 
 
Figure 11.  Question 13: Program Effect, Resiliency 
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14. Question 14 
What effect has the JCTAWS or IEMC program had on your agency or 
jurisdiction’s preparedness (ability to prepare, train, and enhance current 
programs or processes prior to an attack)? 
A majority, or 89 percent (n=13), answered this question positively and 
73 percent of responses indicated both a positive effect and increased preparedness (see 
Figure 12). The remaining 13 percent of respondents indicated a neutral perspective. The 
totality of responses suggests that JCTAWS and IEMC have a positive impact on 
preparedness activities. 
Similar to question #13 findings, the responses to question #14 indicate that a 
domestic model for CCA preparedness does not exist. Agencies or jurisdictions may feel 
more prepared, but how that preparedness is measured and exercised after JCTAWS and 
IEMC is not consistent. A majority of respondents considered their agency or jurisdiction 
positively affected by the JCTAWS or IEMC, which could include the introduction of 
new policies or programs. However, to indicate an increase in preparedness would imply 
that the agency or jurisdiction has addressed gaps and assessed its preparedness level 
against the federal preparedness baseline capabilities. There are not enough data points 
associated with this survey to draw a firm conclusion, although the following question 
provides some level of clarity. 
 
Figure 12.  Question14: Program Effect, Preparedness 
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15. Question 15 
Relating to questions #13 and #14, how has your agency or jurisdiction 
further prepared for a complex coordinated attack? (Please be specific.) 
Fifteen participants responded to this question and many responses were very 
specific in explaining proactive enhancements. The following are examples of specific 
actions taken by state and local responders that have attended JCTAWS or IEMC; some 
responses have been rephrased or redacted to prevent association with a specific locality 
or agency.81 
• FD25—“More training.” 
• TF02—“We are looking at long-term solutions, as opposed to short-term 
solutions gains with no sustainability.” 
This agency has hosted a suite of regional training that is multi-disciplined 
(law enforcement, fire department, intelligence functions), and also 
enhanced working relationships with state, local, and federal agencies that 
would respond to a CCA. 
• PD04—One agency is working with the local FBI to develop a unified 
terrorism response framework, which focuses on reducing confusion and 
increasing communication when a terrorist attack occurs. This agency has 
conducted a variety of high-threat training and obtained equipment to 
address tactical emergency casualty care capabilities, and has 
implemented various active-threat aspects of the “Hartford Consensus.” 
Further, the respondent recognized the value of both the fusion center and 
partnerships at the state and federal level and implemented the first “See 
Something, Say Something” program in his or her jurisdiction. 
• EM05—“Implemented the rescue task force model and trained over 2000 
fire, EMS, and law enforcement partners.” 
                                                 
81 Some responses included the participant’s agency or jurisdiction. List items without quotation 
marks are either redacted to protect the participant, or the author has paraphrased the response. 
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• FD06—“We are working on Suspicious Activity Reporting System, 
coordination between entities, intelligence, information sharing, tactical 
emergency casualty care. It is a little slow going due to funding and the 
interest of elected officials, however it has been good for conversation.” 
• EM07—“There is now an open dialogue, organizations (not just 
intelligence personnel) receive briefings on recent events, trends, and 
attack methods.” 
• EM08—“Many measures have been done within committee but the 
implementation has been slow due to the challenges above and other 
public pressing issues.” 
“When requesting more time to prepare, more funding and commitment 
[to] day-to-day activities take priority. This is a challenge to get the buy-in 
for such advance measures when the elected officials do not see the true 
threat and only look at the ‘unnecessary’ cost.” 
• FD11—“Other drivers have been used to prepare for CCAs. Not the 
JCTAWS recommendations.” 
• EM14—“Identification of additional areas needing planning, training, or 
exercises. Additionally, we are always more prepared when our leadership 
is involved in major exercises or workshops.” 
• PD23—“We have made positive changes as I described earlier in the 
survey. These were the most tangible benefits to the JCTAWS. In addition 
to those, I believe the biggest benefit was the fact that the exercise brought 
these topics to the attention of senior leadership in all the major disciplines 
in our region. The fact that agencies placed enough importance to have so 
many of our leaders attend was huge for us. It allowed for high-level 
discussions of important topics in a low-stress environment. Many of our 
leaders approached me days and even weeks later to compliment the 
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exercise. One of our colonels said it was the most beneficial exercise he 
had ever attended.” 
• EM26—“The IEMC course has increased our situational awareness and 
has improved overall multi-jurisdictional coordination including mutual 
aid, public information/messaging, and operational response. Moreover, 
there were several policy changes that either have been instituted and/or 
will be added to plans and training. However, in the 
equipment/technological, personnel and/or training (Tabletop/full scale 
exercise), there are funding constraints that prevent the jurisdiction from 
implementation.” 
• FD16—“More of a Public Safety approach and not Fire, Police, EMS, 
EM; but a real focus on integration, policy development and MOUs, 
regular integrated training, meetings with governmental and non-
governmental partners, developing training and policy around everything, 
trends in the way we are being threatened, networking in the Intel 
community to stay updated on changing patterns.” 
The word cloud shown in Figure 13 represents the responses and common themes 
provided by the participants. Although the word “training” was used the most, it 
describes both the conducting of training and the need for CCA training. 
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Figure 13.  Question 15: Terms Associated with further CCA Preparation 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This portion of the research was needed because, before this survey, data relating 
to JCTAWS and IEMC had not been collected to this degree. Even so, the information 
gleaned from the study does not represent all JCTAWS and IEMC participants during the 
2011–2016 period. That fact alone is telling. There is no explanation for why less than 
half of the invitees decided to participate in the survey. Equally compelling is that 
58 percent (n=15) of the twenty-six POCs completed the survey in its entirety. One 
assumption is that the respondents did not have the answers to uncompleted questions. 
Another assumption is that the questions were intrusive and could expose shortcomings 
identified in the findings report.  
Conversely, there is limited scholarly research or literature on CCAs; the author’s 
presumption was that more JCTAWS and IEMC participants would take interest and 
complete the survey entirely. One explanation of nonresponse involves the prospective 
respondent’s lack of interest in the subject.82 While this is impossible to measure within 
the scope of this research, the fact that only 56 percent (n=23) of the forty-one selectees 
started the survey and only 37 percent (n=15) completed the survey is troubling because 
they had an opportunity to contribute to an emerging homeland security topic. However, 
the author does acknowledge that the survey design and methodology could be improved. 
The process of aggregating the data collected for this project uncovered a wealth 
of topical areas that point to increased preparedness, a variety of training and exercises, 
and state and local first responder challenges. In the next section, major themes and 
findings from Chapters II and III are highlighted. 
                                                 





When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that it is 
thoroughly out of hand we apply too late the remedies which then might 
have effected a cure. There is nothing new in the story. It is as old as the 
sibylline books. It falls into that long, dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness 
of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind. Want of 
foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, 
lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, 
until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong—these are the features 
which constitute the endless repetition of history. 
—Winston Churchill 
 
This chapter has five parts. The first section discusses the findings and themes for 
both the JCTAWS and IEMC programs and recommendations for improvement. The 
findings are a result of content and thematic analysis of both the FEMA reports as well as 
the online participant survey. The second section includes recommendations and the third 
identifies implementation issues, next steps, and areas of further exploration. The fourth 
section discusses limitations, and the final section includes concluding remarks. In sum, 
the federal support arm that has a responsibility for CCA preparedness must concentrate 
on resilient adaptation and not on efficiency or maintaining the status quo. The current 
mechanism to prepare for a CCA mirrors that of an efficient machine rather than an 
adaptive model. 
A. JCTAWS/IEMC FINDINGS  
Participants involved in this research reported a positive evaluation of the overall 
program, including high marks for comprehensiveness, value, and degree of difficulty. 
Overall, the rating responses to survey questions in these three areas ranged from 4.05 to 
4.7 on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). This data is valuable for FEMA and other federal 
programs that are responsible for preparing and training state and local first responder 
agencies. The anonymous survey responses help identify how the attendees perceived the 
training program, and can thus guide course redirection or evolution. 
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1. Increased Resiliency and Preparedness 
Municipalities conveyed they are more resilient and prepared because of their 
participation in the JCTAWS or IEMC course. However, a majority of respondents did 
not provide additional supporting explanation or substantiating examples. Those who did 
respond pointed to the importance of senior leadership attendance rather than specific 
factors of the course exercises themselves. Moreover, some respondents mentioned other 
programs that are within the scope of preparedness, but may not address CCA 
preparedness like JCTAWS or IEMC. This dilemma could stem from the lack of national 
strategy, or perhaps from the fact that the JCTAWS and IEMC programs as a whole do 
not have the capacity to provide additional guidance once the program is complete and 
the final report issued. In other words, end users could benefit from an additional phase in 
both programs that is designed to assist the participating agency with gap mitigation. 
Maintaining the status quo is an option as well, but the data provided within this 
thesis recommends against doing so. To be sure, the 2016 National Preparedness Report 
(NPR) maintains that national preparedness and resiliency is accomplished through five 
core areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.83 In other words, 
preparedness and resiliency are goals of these core areas. And although the NPR did 
recognize JCTAWS and some steps the nation took to address CCAs, the report focused 
on preventing a CCA and not preparedness or resiliency, as state and locals “took steps to 
strengthen their ability to address complex terrorist attacks.”84 Nevertheless, despite 
significant ambiguity in national policy, this research shows improvement in state and 
local first responder preparedness through the JCTAWS and IEMC training and exercise 
programs. 
 
                                                 
83 DHS, National Preparedness Report. 
84 DHS, 30. 
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2. Major Areas/Cities Do Not Have a Unified Plan to Respond to a CCA 
It is not surprising that thirty-one out of thirty-two jurisdictions that have attended 
either JCTAWS or IEMC do not have a unified plan to respond to a CCA. Developing a 
domestic CCA plan prior to 2016, before the Paris attack in 2015, might have been akin 
to developing a plan for an asteroid strike or Ebola exposure; CCAs are low-frequency 
and high-risk events, they are not part of routine emergency response policy, and 
responders do not have any experience to help them develop a comprehensive plan for 
such events.  
However, federal guidance dating back to 2001, such as the 9/11 and Gilmore 
Commission Reports, identify the need to address and prepare for emerging issues such 
as CCAs. Similar to the asteroid strike example, perhaps one reason that the federal 
government, and ultimately state and local governments, do not have a structured method 
to develop a unified CCA plan is because the United States has not yet experienced a 
CCA. Another practical explanation could be complacency. In late 2001, retired Colonel 
John R. Brinkerhoff described complacency as “an attitude of self-satisfaction that 
inhibits consideration of unpleasant things.”85 Or, put another way, the ego defies reality. 
There is a clear element of complacency related to this research, as discovered during 
examination of the online survey. Two specific questions and subsequent answers were 
surprising: 
Question 12: Has your agency or jurisdiction implemented any JCTAWS or IEMC 
findings and recommendations? Respondents were encouraged to provide the number of 
recommendations implemented in a comment box. One participant stated “the areas for 
improvement were minimal,” but the JCTAWS report for that same municipality 
identified twenty-five significant gaps. Those gaps included a lack of response plan to 
address a multi-site, multi-agency response to a terrorist attack; a gap in recalling 
emergency personnel; a gap in information sharing and situational awareness; and a gap 
in high-threat, multi-discipline training and equipment.  
                                                 
85 John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Relationship of Warning and Response in Homeland Security,” Journal 
of Homeland Security (December 2001), 6, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=442533. 
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Question 15: Relating to questions #13 and #14, how has your agency or 
jurisdiction further prepared for a complex coordinated attack? (Please be specific). This 
question included a comment box for the respondents to provide information about how 
they have furthered their training, policies, collaboration, or other related activities. The 
same participant stated, “Our agency and jurisdiction experienced [and incident]. Based 
on that [incident] response, it was clear that the area was prepared for the type of 
response needed during this incident.”86 In fact, this respondent’s agency came under 
public, media, and emergency management industry scrutiny for its uneven response to 
the incident. The culture and danger of complacency is real, especially with a threat that, 
domestically, is new to first responders.  
The second finding is that if a CCA occurs in the United States, the nation will 
experience the reverberation of the attack, much like the situation on the morning of 
September 11, 2001, and beyond. This is not to suggest that any one locality lacks the 
ability to manage the entire incident, although that capability remains relatively 
unknown. However, a CCA is the counter-argument to the notion that “all disasters are 
local.” A report produced by Arlington County, Virginia, provides additional support to 
this claim. The report states, “Response to a terrorist incident will not be a local event. 
Preparedness, response, and recovery will be regional, and plans and funding should 
reflect this regionalism. Teamwork spanning the Federal, State, and local level is critical 
to a successful response and recovery.”87 Another report produced by the Arlington 
County Fire Department represents the U.S. geographical areas that responded to the 
Pentagon on 9/11.88 In total, nine states and eighteen federal, state, local, and non-
governmental assets (indicated in Figure 14) were sent requests for mutual aid. 
                                                 
86 Information was redacted to protect the identity of the participant. 
87 Arlington County, “Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the 
Pentagon” (conference report, Arlington County, 2003), 27, https://icma.org/sites/default/files/4272_.pdf.  
88 Titan Systems Corporation, “Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to the 




Figure 14.  Map of Resources that Responded to the Pentagon Attack on 9/1189 
3. No Clear Picture on How Many Gaps Have Been Addressed 
No national system exists to measure how many gaps remain in the JCTAWS and 
IEMC participants’ jurisdictions. Eighty percent of survey participants stated that they 
were addressing gaps, but could not articulate how many or which gaps had been 
addressed. Further, there is not a national system to highlight, champion, and share best 
practices from agencies and jurisdictions that have successfully developed policies, plans, 
and exercises to address the gaps. Perhaps one major barrier is the sharing and 
distribution of JCTAWS and IEMC information. Albeit sensitive, analysis of gaps and 
best practices can be shared nationwide at the unclassified level without specific 
geographical identifiers. This could benefit domestic agencies that do not meet the 
JCTAWS or IEMC criteria. 
                                                 
89 Source: Titan Systems Corperation, A-47. 
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4. No CCA National Strategy 
There is no national domestic strategy to prepare for or respond to a CCA. Unless 
state and local first responders attend JCTAWS or IEMC, then the only generic guidance 
for overall preparedness resides within federal documents such as the NPS, NPR, and 
specifically, the NPG. However, these federal documents are limited, and unlike the 
JCTAWS or IEMC summary reports, they do not provide a pathway or strategy that state 
and local entities can translate into action. The NPG and the NPR are structured by the 
five core mission areas (prevention, protection, response, mitigation, and recovery). In 
theory, once the tenets of these mission areas are achieved, agencies will have met the 
preparedness goal. However, attaining success at the state and local level is not an easy 
task, especially if the goal is to become “a secure and resilient Nation with the 
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.90 
Nevertheless, the trifecta of concern is a lack of clear and identifiable national-level CCA 
policy, declined federal funding, and the fact that CCAs are treated as a line item rather 
than an emerging and unfamiliar threat. 
5. First Responders Are Adapting 
The lack of national guidance and policy to prepare for a CCA may have 
implications that have not been assessed at the federal level, nor perhaps recognized at 
the state and local levels. To be sure, the previous graphs in Chapter III represent 
responders’ challenge to attain proficiency in one core mission area, not to mention two 
or more, as would be necessary in a CCA. From the first responder perspective, 
supported by the research conducted for this thesis, two important findings emerge.  
First: First responders, namely law enforcement officials and 
firefighters/paramedics, are still adapting to the reality that active-shooter incidents are 
occurring more often and that traditional tactics (i.e., firefighters stage and wait) are 
                                                 
90 DHS, National Preparedness Report, 1. 
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outdated.91 For example, according to the FBI, the number of active-shooter occurrences 
has increased from seventeen incidents in 2013 to twenty in 2014, 2015, and 2016.92 A 
previous FBI report indicates that an average of six active-shooter events occurred 
between 2000 and 2006, whereas an average of sixteen active-shooter incidents occurred 
between 2008 and 2012.93 Therefore, from a capability outlook, modifying policy to 
address this threat is more necessary—because it is more likely—than modifying policy 
to address a potential CCA. This includes the insertion of the Rescue Task Force model, 
in which both law enforcement and fire and rescue personnel enter a hostile area to triage 
victims. In 2012, the Rescue Task Force tactic was not commonplace, and was not even 
discussed as an option.94 The change in the national discussion, local policy, public 
safety culture, and mission were a product of almost two decades of significant domestic 
active-shooter events. 
Second: Given this shift in the first responder mission that ultimately addresses a 
high-frequency, high-risk event, first responders across the nation are producing results in 
active shooter policy and mission modification. Specific examples include Fairfax 
County, Virginia’s, Active Threat Joint Operations Guide, Arlington County, Virginia’s, 
High Threat Operations Guide, and Houston, Texas’ cross-trained strike teams.95 
However, the implication is clear from the online survey: when participants were 
surveyed about JCTAWS, IEMC, and CCA preparedness, responses included reference 
to active-shooter and Rescue Task Force training rather than to a multi-site, multi-
jurisdictional attack. This implies that active-shooter training may take precedence over 
                                                 
91 Michael Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property: High Threat Response,” Homeland Security 
Affairs XI (2015), http://search.proquest.com/openview/59c10615170ebaa4dd95ad312309910e/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=1336360. 
92 “2000 to 2016 Active Shooter Incidents,” FBI, accessed October 11, 2017, https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/activeshooter_incidents_2001-2016.pdf/view. 
93 John Peterson Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United 
States, 2000–2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2013). 
94 Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property.” 
95 Johnson, “Changing the Paradigm”; Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property”; Cynthia M. 
Vargas, “Tactical Firefighter Teams: Pivoting toward the Fire Service’s Evolving Homeland Security 
Mission” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016). 
 62 
CCA training because an active-shooter situation is a clear and present issue. 
Furthermore, active-shooter tactics were observed in both the Mumbai and Paris CCAs. 
B. NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three recommendations are provided that will help solve the issues identified in 
this research.  
1. National High-Threat Incident Response Institution 
There are many networks that already exist to further a specific state or local 
mission and to advocate for legislative change. Examples include the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
However, a formal state and local network of multi-discipline first responders that 
focuses on evolving threats and national policy does not exist.96 The nation would benefit 
from a common-ground network—a think-tank institution for emerging hazards and high-
threat incident response strategy that enables all state and local first responders to 
implement change. The domestic high-threat incident response institution will provide 
first responders with rapid and emerging threat data, perhaps from terrorist incidents, 
scholarly research, and support for solutions to difficult problems.  
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point serves as a framework model for 
this recommendation. For example, the Center “conducts rigorous and policy relevant 
research that contributes to the academic body of knowledge and informs 
counterterrorism policy” and has also been instrumental in training the Fire Department 
of New York in counterterrorism leadership studies.97 However, this level of objectivity 
is insufficient for all state and local first responders.  
The development of such an institution would respond to a variety of findings in 
this research, including gaps in cross-discipline training, regional or mutual aid 
emergency plans, and preparedness best practices, and would provide agencies with a 
                                                 
96 It should be noted that a related organization does exist, but it focuses on counterterrorism, which is 
not applicable to all first responders 
97 “Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,” accessed October 11, 2017, https://ctc.usma.edu/. 
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roadmap for implementing and reaching preparedness benchmarks to meet NPG or other 
future guidance. 
2. JCTAWS and IEMC Enhancements 
NCTC and FEMA should consider two recommendations specific to these 
courses. First, an agency’s participation in JCTAWS or IEMC should be considered step 
one in a three-step process. Upon completion, step two will include working directly with 
federal agencies to address gaps, secure funding, and develop a timeline of goals and 
measurable benchmarks to obtain baseline capabilities. This step may be ongoing over a 
period of years, yet it forges the collaboration and strengthens the guidance between 
NCTC or FEMA and the state or local jurisdiction. Step three involves sharing best 
practices—innovative ways to address a gap or implement a solution. NCTC and FEMA 
are in a leading position to connect participants, who would be otherwise unaware of 
other jurisdictions’ participation.  
Second, jurisdictions that do not meet the minimum requirement for either course, 
or do not have sufficient travel or training funds, should be afforded some opportunity to 
engage in collaboration with the JCTAWS or IEMC programs. For example, instead of a 
traditional delivery of JCTAWS or IEMC, state and local agencies or jurisdictions would 
benefit from a process that includes a self-assessment, a formal report on the findings and 
recommendations of the self-assessment by JCTAWS or IEMC staff, and a post-
evaluation six months after the assessment, and again at one year after the assessment. 
This second recommendation should be considered a follow-up item from the first 
recommendation.  
3. National Leadership Engagement 
Lastly, change will be limited unless national, state, and local leadership; 
emergency service labor unions; and other first responder and private-sector coalitions 
unite. Discussion about CCAs must precede a CCA occurrence in our nation. First 
responders are not strangers to collaboration, but they often struggle to see unknowns 
through another lens. Glen Woodbury, director for the Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, recognized this need in his 2004 thesis entitled “Recommendations for 
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Homeland Security Organizational Approaches at the State Government Level.” In his 
summary of findings, Woodbury states: 
The multi-governmental battlefield for terrorism is broader and more 
complex than any other issue that has faced this nation since the civil war. 
The involvement and commitment of states, local jurisdictions and the 
private sector is critical to the success in this battle, and the leadership of 
state governments is not only required explicitly and implicitly, it is the 
only level in which the broadest interaction and facilitation of all partners 
can be effected.98 
To be sure, CCAs are not just a federal, state, or local issue. No one government 
has the resources, time, money, capacity, or experience to develop the power for a 
domestic conversation or the results of multi-government collaboration. However, up to 
the point that national leadership really engages, this thesis and the findings within will 
remain relevant. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
The research conducted in this thesis appears to be the first of its kind for this 
topic. Inquiry into the wicked problem, domestic first responder experience, CCA 
programs and barriers, and related research and analysis is limited by a dearth of credible 
and fundamental information. Although a simple Google search of “complex coordinated 
attack” yields over one million results, scholarly research and data are scarce. 
Nevertheless, appreciative inquiry into current federal preparedness documents has aided 
in the discovery of both challenges and opportunities. A key limitation to this research, 
however, is the lack of both strategy and expected outcomes for CCA preparedness, 
which remains unbalanced and unmeasured, and lacks maturity. The success of JCTAWS 
and IEMC is limited to the availability of federal tax dollars and the support and 
attendance of state and local agencies. Further, the availability of JCTAWS and IEMC is 
limited to jurisdictions with a population of 100,000 or higher.99 Federal agencies should 
consider the second recommendation (from the previous section) in order to expose 
                                                 
98 Glen L. Woodbury, “Recommendations for Homeland Security Organizational Approaches at the 
State Government Level” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 3, http://calhoun.nps.edu/ 
handle/10945/1488.  
99 FEMA, “Course: E/L0912.” 
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jurisdictions to these programs and increase national collaboration on emerging threats. 
Therefore, until the United States experiences a CCA, or we are able to successfully put 
into place effective and measurable CCA preparedness programs, our ability to adapt our 
response capabilities a horrific CCA scenario is restricted by imagination. 
D. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY AND RESEARCH 
The topic of CCAs is wide open for scholars and researchers; this thesis is the 
first step in understanding and preparing for an emerging threat that is effective and 
destructive. To that end, future research should be conducted to determine the feasibility 
for a model domestic CCA policy. The findings and gaps discussed in Chapter II 
highlight the need to develop a pathway from gap identification to gap mitigation. 
Further study is needed on best practices for state and local CCA preparedness. 
More specifically, scholars should expand on the survey in Chapter III in order to capture 
additional data on what exactly qualifies as a best practice, how a best practice is 
implemented, and how to address new barriers or challenges that state and local agencies 
or jurisdictions may face during implementation or policy development. 
Finally, the nation would benefit from analysis of historic CCAs over the past ten 
years. Specifically, the analysis should focus on first responders’ pre-attack preparation 
and how it affected the outcome of the incident. Policy and emergency operations plans 
should be scrutinized not only to assess modern challenges, such as cross-discipline 
training and functional training exercises, but to assess effectiveness of the policy or plan 
during the incident. Perhaps a future researcher could also conduct comparative analysis 
in order to extract positive and fresh ideas. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Only time will tell when the first CCA will occur on American soil. When it does 
occur, the attack cycle will likely commence in a crowded place filled with innocent 
civilians, as it has so many times before. Attackers will use any means necessary to carry 
out the plan until they are stopped. In the wake of this attack, first responders will still 
respond and attempt to mitigate any familiar and unfamiliar emergencies, even in hostile 
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environments, but at an increased personal risk if they are not adequately prepared. These 
were the actions of so many global first responders, and these will be the same actions in 
the coming years. 
The United States and its first responder community have been presented with a 
unique challenge: prepare for or ignore the CCA threat. Acting on the former will not be 
an easy task; change involves a culture adjustment, policy development, leadership 
commitment, and a general understanding of the CCA narrative. This thesis has identified 
numerous themes that can help address the current mode of operation. One thing is sure: 
the current preparedness model is not working to its full potential. Missed opportunities 
at the federal, state, and local level that are not fully addressed now will likely result in a 
regurgitation of the same after-action findings. Look no further than the 9/11 
Commission Report, the Gilmore Commission Report, and others that speak about 
preparedness, collaboration, and complacency over decades.  
This thesis and its hundreds of hours of research, analysis, reading, and 
discussions should not sit idle. We have two choices: move forward and continue the 
route of scholarly research and dialogue, or sit and wait. The expectation of the nation’s 
first responders, and the citizens they have vowed to serve, is that we evolve, adapt, and 
move forward in the face of emerging threats. Only certain powers have the ability to 
make this happen. Let’s move forward. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.   Example JCTAWS/IEMC Capability Gap Matrix100 
 
Table 2.   Mission Areas and Core Capabilities101 
 
                                                 
100 Example from FEMA report (source information redacted to make sample publicly releasable). 
101 Source: DHS, National Preparedness Report. 
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Table 3.   IEMC Core Assessment Criteria102 
 
  
                                                 
102 Source: FEMA, “Course: E/L0912.” 
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